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I. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an Order dismissing Plaintiffs action dated 
December 14, 1998. This Court is vested with jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)0). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The main issue for this Court to decide is whether the trial court 
failed to view every inference in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff before 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice when the effect of the 
dismissal is with prejudice since the statute of limitations precludes the Plaintiff 
from re-filing his action against the Defendants. 
Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss contrary to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without 
providing for either amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint or allowing a continuance 
for Plaintiff to provide testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the oral 
assignment. 
Whether the facts in this matter clearly demonstrate that there was 
1 
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a valid oral assignment so the Plaintiff is the proper party in interest to maintain 
this action. 
Whether the facts in this matter when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Defendant would preclude the trial court from granting the 




The determinative statute in this proceeding is Rule 17(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted 
in name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has 
been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of 
the action by, or joinder or substitution shall have the same effect 
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party 
in interest. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
* A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is a dispute between the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, and 
the Defendants Lee Ritter, Susan Ritter and Darwin Fisher regarding the 
payment of $250,000.00 by LeRoy Townsend Sr. to Lee Ritter so that Lee Ritter 
2 
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could establish an aloe vera business. Mr. Townsend, Sr. never received any 
benefit from his investment; he received in exchange for his $250,000.00 
payment to Lee Ritter a stock certificate in a defunct company that had been 
purchased for $5,000.00 and had not done business in several years, with the 
defunct company never being revived by Lee Ritter. Lee Ritter, who was the 
recipient of the $250,000.00 continues to do business in Texas and owns an 
aloe vera farm. Mr. Townsend Sr. assigned all of his rights in this cause of 
action to the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
A Complaint in this action was filed on August 13,1993 by the 
Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, against the Defendants, Lee Ritter, Susan Ritter and 
Darwin C. Fisher seeking among other things return of the $250,000.00 which 
Mr. Townsend Sr. paid to the Defendants, Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter. [R. at 1-
7]. A Default Judgment was entered January 4, 1994. [R. at 24]. An Order 
Setting Aside the Default Judgment was entered on February 25, 1994. [ R. at 
54]. Various court proceedings involving the reinstatement of the Default 
judgment ensued during the next 3 V2 years [R. at 61 to 123]. An Answer was 
not filed until September 17,1997 [R. at 121 to 124]. 
3 
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
On December 7, 1998, this matter came on for hearing before 
Judge Gary D. Stott on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against the 
Defendants Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter [R. at 193-194] and Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss [R. at 362]. The Court held that there was not a valid assignment 
from LeRoy Townsend Sr. to the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, and that the proper > 
party in interest was the Townsend Trust rather than Steven C. Davis or Mr. 
LeRoy Townsend Sr. [R. at 451-453]. The Proposed Order was mailed to 
Plaintiffs counsel on December 10, 1998 and signed by Judge Stott on 
December 14, 1998. [R. at 451 -453]. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about December 21, 1991, LeRoy Townsend, Sr., 
Trustee and beneficiary of the LeRoy Willis Townsend Trust paid $250,000.00 to 
Lee Riter to get into the aloe vera business. Mr. Townsend had just been 
diagnosed with cancer and had seen tapes from Lee Ritter extolling the benefits 
of aloe vera in the cure of cancer. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at Exhibit 19]. 
2. Defendants Lee and Susan Ritter are husband and wife. [R. 
4 
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at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.2]. 
3. Defendant Darwin C. Fisher was formerly president and 
owner of Ideal Nutritional Concepts, Inc., ("Ideal") a Washington corporation. [R. 
at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.2]. 
4. Ideal was organized as a multi-level marketing entity. [R. at 
361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.2]. 
5. Ideal was not successful and Defendant, Darwin C. Fisher, 
allowed Ideal to cease operations, and it had in fact ceased operations in the 
latter part of 1989. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 
p.2]. 
6. Ideal owned a license for a software program designed for 
multilevel companies. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment at p.2-3]. 
7. On December 21, 1991, Fisher conducted a meeting of 
Ideal's Board of Directors pursuant to a Waiver of Notice of Meeting of Directors 
of Ideal Nutritional Concepts, Inc. executed December 23, 1991 by Darwin C. 
Fisher and Cheryl Fisher. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment at p.3]. 
8. On December 21, 1991, the Ideal Board adopted the 
5 
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following: 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
Further resolved that the board of Directors ratify, as 
executed, the agreement for sale which agreement selling 
the stock of NCI [Ideal] to Lee Ritter, which is attached 
hereto and marked as Exhibit A and incorporated herein. 
[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment 
at p.3]. 
9. In the Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors held 
December 21, 1991, pursuant to waivers of Notice, Darwin C. Fisher presiding, 
the Board of Ideal adopted the following resolution: 
SALE OF BUSINESS 
Resolved that all the stock of NCI [Ideal] shall be sold to 
Susan Ritter and LeRoy Townsend, Sr. on the terms and 
conditions as set forth in the contract of sale which is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A. 
[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment 
at p.3]. 
10. The contract of Sale referred to in the above-referenced 
resolution was never received by LeRoy Townsend,Sr. R. at 361; Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment at p.5]. 
11. Darwin C. Fisher and Cheryl Fisher signed a stock 
certificate to sell, assign and transfer 700 shares to Susan Ritter and 800 shares 
to LeRoy Townsend, Sr. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary 
6 
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Judgment at p.4]. 
12. Darwin C. Fisher states Lee Ritter purchased the stock of 
Ideal in order to purchase the software program licensed to it and paid Fisher 
between $3,000.00 and $5,000.00 for the purchase of Ideal. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.5]. 
13. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter produced a photocopy of a letter 
from Townsend Sr. dated 12-27-1991 which states in part: 
Lee Ritter: 
Enclosed is our check for $250,000.00 40% of the Voting 
stock shares in full. In The Ideal Nutritional Concepts Inc. 
(incorporated in the state of Washington). This Voting 
stock to be in the name of LeRoy Willis Townsend, Trustee 
for the Living Trust of LeRoy Townsend and Esther Ruth 
Townsend recorded October 27, 1967 in Los Angeles 
County, State of California. [R. at 361; Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment at p. 6]. 
14. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter responded to an Interrogatory: 
INTERROGATORY N0.26: Please give a complete 
account of the nature of your dealings [with] LeRoy 
Townsend in December of 1991 whereby he wrote you a 
check for two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) 
*t on December 27, 1991 to include each and every promise 
you made to him in exchange for the money so tendered 
and the benefits which he received as a result of the 
payment of this money to you. [R. at 361; Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment at p. 6]. 
RESPONSE: NONE 
7 
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15. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter responded to an Interrogatory: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: With regard to all conversations 
between the Defendants [and] Mr. LeRoy Townsend from 
January 1, 1992 through December 27, 1992, state the 
following: 
g. State the date of the conversation; 
h. Identify the names, addresses and telephone numbers 
of all persons present; 
i. State the substance of the conversation; and, 
j. Identify [any] and all documents in your possession or 
under your control which evidence in your answer to this 
Interrogatory including but not limited to, dairies [sic], 
journals, minuets [sic] of meetings, letters, recordings or any 
other documents. 
RESPONSE:: In June 1992 there was a discussion between 
Lee Ritter, Susan Ritter and Leroy Townsend with regard to 
stock certificates. There was also a number of 
conversations between the Ritters and Mr. Townsend with 
regard to orders Mr. Townsend placed with the Ritters. Mr. 
Ritter met with Mr. Townsend and his wife Ester [sic] some 
time in 1992. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p.6-7]. 
16. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter have produced a photocopy of a 
stock certificate dated 18 April, 1992 to certify that LEROY TOWNSEND TRUST 
is the owner of 4,000 shares of Capital Stock of Ideal Nutritional Concepts, Inc., 
signed by Susan Ritter as "Sec/Treas.M [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p. 7]. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17. The State of Washington Department of Licensing Business 
Licenses record contains a Corporate License Renewal\Annual Report form 
signed by Susan Ritter as Chairman of the Board for Idea. Leiand Ritter is listed 
as Vice President of Ideal and Susan Ritter is listed as secretary, treasurer and 
chairman of the board of Ideal as of April 15, 1992. Leiand Ritter and Susan 
Ritter list their addresses as Thornton, Colorado. [R. at 361; Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment at p. 8]. 
18. The State of Washington records indicate that Ideal never 
became active as a corporation. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p. 8]. 
19. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter responded to an Interrogatory: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Please describe in detail what has 
happened to the products and personal property owned by Ideal 
Nutritional Concepts, Inc. which were purchased with corporate 
funds. 
RESPONSE: Sold to Customers, Taken without permission by 
Loren Ritter. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment at p. 9]. 
t 2. An undated brochure for a company called Aloe Products 
International Inc. and Subsidiaries which contains an unaudited financial 
statement dated "as of 10/15/92M lists Loren Ritter as a consultant for Aloe 
Products International, 1351 West 121st Avenue, Westminster, Colorado 80234. 
9 
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[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.9]. 
3. Susan Ritteir and Lee Ritter were doing business or 
intending to do business in Colorado in 1992 with or on behalf of Aloe Products 
International because a brochure for that entity indicates that stock was 
available for purchase. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment at 9]. 
4. On November 15, 1992, Susan Ritter signed a merger 
agreement to merge (through sale) Ideal Nutritional Concepts and other 
companies with or into Aloe Products International, Inc. [R. at 361; Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment at p.9]. 
5. The merger agreement agrees to provide Ideal Nutritional 
Concepts with one million shares of Aloe Products International, Inc. as the 
purchase price for Ideal in the merger. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p. 10]. 
6. The merger did not come to fruition because the parties 
were not able to obtain requisite representations that the companies, including 
Ideal, were viable, as required by the merger agreement. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 10]. 
7. The Utah Department of Commerce issued a Certificate of 
10 
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Involuntary Dissolution for Aloe Products International, Inc. on June 1, 1993. [R. 
at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgement at p. 10]. 
8. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter have submitted a written 
statement from Mr. Townsend Sr. apparently dated December 2 or 3, 1992, 
brought to a notary public December 8, 1992, in which Mr. Townsend Sr. 
purports to have withdrawn authority under the assignment. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 10]. 
9. Plaintiff and his attorney have submitted affidavits reporting 
a telephone conversation with Mr. Townsend Sr. in which the attorney advised 
Townsend he could not properly violate the assignment. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 11]. 
10. Mr. Townsend Sr. stated in an affidavit: 
In December, 1991, I was told by my doctor that I had prostrate 
cancer. I am 84 years old, my father and sister had died of cancer, 
my brother has prostrate cancer, so I was very frightened for my 
life. 
I heard a speech by Lee Ritter extolling the benefits of Aloe to 
cancer patients, plus he gave me several cassette tapes all telling 
\ the benefits to people using Aloe for cancer, plus he was Mormon 
by faith and I had many Mormon friends, all honest and trustworthy, 
therefore I had complete confidence in his honesty. 
He told me he was starting a Company, to market Aloe and needed 
$250,000 immediately to proceed with the organizing of the Aloe 
Company. I think my $250,000 was the only money to start the 
11 
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business. 
December 27, 1991, I mailed him a check for $250,000.00. He 
promised me 40% of the Aloe business and unlimited profits. 
In a case in Colorado Court, his son, Loren Ritter was sued by Lee 
and Susan Ritter received as his separate ownership, a portion of 
Lee and Susan Ritters Aloe business, which Lee Ritter told me 
would give Loren Ritter a return of one million per year. 
[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 10-
11]. 
11. In July 1995, Mr. Townsend Jr. was appointed as agent and 
attorney in fact under Uniform Statutory Power in California to act on behalf of 
his father on consent of his father. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p. 11 ]. 
12. Mr. Townsend, Jr. confirms that the assignment of the 
claims to Plaintiff remains in effect and that his father received no benefits from 
his payment of $250,000.00 to Lee Ritter. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment at p. 11 ]. 
13. Lee Ritter has continued doing business with respect to aloe 
since obtaining the $250,000.00 from Mr. Townsend Sr. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 12]. 
14. Telephone records and Internet information indicate Lee 
Ritter resides in or near Carrolton, Texas; he is associated with a company 
12 
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called Ritter & Associates and owns aloe vera interests. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 13]. 
15. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter own an aloe vera farm in 
Mexico. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 12]. 
16. Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter have not conducted business 
with Mr. Townsend, Sr. during 1992 and subsequent to that time. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court improperly held that at the time of filing this 
cause of action a valid assignment did not exist when the evidence clearly 
demonstrates that an oral assignment existed prior to the filing of the Complaint 
in this action. In the alternative, equity requires that this verbal assignment be 
recognized even if it is found that the strict terms of the law were not followed 
since it is more than evident from the actions of the parties that they intended 
that there be an assignment. 
II. The trial court improperly granted Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss since they failed to view every inference in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. In addition, the trial court as provided for in Rule 17(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure should have allowed the Plaintiff leave to amend his 
13 
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Complaint or in the alternative granted a continuance. 
III. Since there was a valid assignment and the Plaintiff is a 
proper party in interest, the trial court incorrectly denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. When all the facts, and all reasonable inferences are 
drawn in favor the Defendant, it is clear that the trial court should have granted 
the Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY HELD THAT AT 
TIME OF FILING THIS CAUSE OF ACTION 
A VALID ASSIGNMENT DID NOT EXIST 
A. A Valid Oral Assignment Existed At the Time of Filing 
This Cause of Action. 
"An assignment may be oral or written and no special form is 
necessary provided that transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of 
interest held by assignor." Matter of Estate of Vaughn. 588 P.2d 1295 (Or. App., 
1979). 
* The Affidavit of Steven C. Davis specifically states as follows: 
Before August 13,1993,1 was present with attorney Richard C. 
Coxson when LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of 
Richard C. Coxson, via telephone conversations. The Terms were 
verbally agreed to between all parties before August 13, 1993. Mr. 
Townsend requested Mr. Coxson to proceed immediately. 
14 
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A formal "Assignment of Right of Action" was signed by LeRoy 
Townsend in California on the 30th day of August, 1993. My 
signature was notarized on this same instrument the 3rd day of 
September, 1993. [R. at 407]. 
In addition, the Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson states as follows: 
I was originally retained by LeRoy W. Townsend, Sr. and by 
Steven C. Davis to represent them and received a retainer fee paid 
by Mr. Townsend. I was aware of the agreement and assignment 
between Mr. Townsend and Mr. Davis which was done for 
consideration. [R. 361; Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at Exhibit 18]. 
Upon a careful examination of the above-referenced Affidavits, the 
affidavit of the Plaintiff establishes that prior to August 13, 1991, which is the 
filing date of the Complaint in this matter, that the Plaintiff was in the office with 
his attorney, Richard C. Coxson, and that through telephone conversations, 
LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of Richard C. Coxson to represent 
him. The terms and conditions of the representation were verbally agreed to at 
that time. In accordance with those verbal agreements, Mr. Coxson proceeded 
and filed the Complaint in this matter naming Steven C. Davis, as the Plaintiff 
and specifically alleging in paragraph 13 that Plaintiff was the assignee of LeRoy 
Townsend. Since Mr. Coxson was present during the telephone conversations 
and prepared the Complaint in this matter, it is quite evident that there was an 
assignment prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter since Mr. Coxson as 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counsel for Plaintiff would not have alleged such in the Complaint at paragraph 
13 [R. at 5]. 
In the hearing in this matter, Judge Stott specifically requested that 
the counsel for Plaintiff demonstrate to the Judge where it said in the affidavit of 
Plaintiff that there was a verbal assignment. Since the affidavits of Plaintiff and 
Richard Coxson did not specifically state that there was a verbal assignment, 
Judge Stott incorrectly ruled that there must not have been a verbal assignment 
even though the actions of the parties demonstrate that a verbal assignment was 
in place prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
B. Equity Requires That the Verbal Assignment in This 
Matter Be Upheld. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that assignments 
that may not be valid under the strict terms of the law are nevertheless valid. In 
Stewart v. Hevwood, 220 P 717, 719 (Utah 1923) it was held as follows: 
It is not essential that an assignment should be perfect at law. It is 
sufficient if it is a good equitable assignment; and it is a good 
equitable assignment whenever, by its terms, the person to whom 
an obligation is due authorizes the payments thereof to another, 
either for his own use, or for that of some other person, or 
authorizes any one to receive or hold moneys and to apply them to 
any specific purpose other than for the use or benefit of the 
assignor, citing 1 Freeman on Executions, 39 (3d Ed.). 
In addition, it has been established that equity requires that the 
16 
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intent of the parties be examined to determine the validity of an assignment. 
Courts of equity can recognize certain kinds of instruments as valid 
equitable assignments where it is necessary to effectuate plain 
intent of parties or where to hold otherwise would be unjust. 
Giles v. Sun Bank N A , 450 So.2d 258 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1984). 
[emphasis added]. 
No particular words or form of instrument is necessary to effect 
equitable assignment and any language, however informal, which 
shows intention on one side to assign a right or chose in action 
and an intention on the other to receive, if there has been valuable 
consideration, will operate as effective equitable assignment, ki 
In the hearing on this matter, Plaintiffs counsel admitted that the 
Affidavits filed in this matter were not as specific as they should have been, but 
that the actions of the parties demonstrated that there was in fact a verbal 
assignment. Counsel for Plaintiff argued to Judge Stott that "Mr. Coxson would 
not have initiated the lawsuit if - he wouldn't have initiated it if he wasn't aware 
of an agreement between Mr. Townsend and Mr. Davis. Transcript of December 
7, 1998 Hearing, at p.21, Ins 21-23 [R. at 466]. 
The record is clear that the parties intended that there be an 
assignment from Mr. Townsend Sr. to the Plaintiff. The attorney acted on the 
instructions of his clients and prepared the Complaint in this matter pursuant to 
the verbal assignment and specifically alleged in the Complaint which was filed 
on August 13 ,1993 and that Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, was the assignee of 
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LeRoy Townsend in paragraph 13 of the Complaint [R. 5]. 
C. The Trial Court Improperly Held That the Proper Party in 
Interest Was the Townsend Trust. 
As previously outlined, there was a valid oral assignment. In the 
alternative, this Court must find that an equitable assignment exists since the 
parties' actions clearly demonstrate that there was in fact an oral assignment 
prior to the filing of the complaint in this matter, and as provided for in Giles, 
supra, this court must hold that there was either a valid oral assignment or an 
equitable assignment. To decide otherwise goes against the plain intent of the 
parties and would clearly result in an unjust enrichment to the Defendants, Lee 
and Susan Ritter, and basically highway robbery to Mr. Townsend Sr. 
"Assignments will ordinarily be construed in accordance with rules 
of construction governing contracts and circumstances surrounding execution of 
assignment document." Horbal v. Moxham Nat. Bank. 697, A. 2d 577 (Pa. 
1977). In Pride Exploration v. Marshall Exploration, 798 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 
1986), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an assignment was valid even 
though the signature did not indicate the capacity in which the assignment was 
signed. The Fifth Circuit held as follows: 
Surprisingly, we have discovered virtually no case law, including 
Texas cases dealing with the question of whether a conveyance 
properly naming the grantor and signed by the proper party, is 
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nevertheless invalid because the signer failed to indicate the 
capacity in which he signed. Our review of the applicable cases 
convinces us that it did not render the title unmarketable for the 
document to lack a specific statement that Sandoz as trustee-in-
bankruptcy for Latham Exploration Company held the power to 
convey the Lexco interest. 
The Pride Exploration court also held as follows: 
[T]hat failure of a signer of a real estate conveyance to indicate the 
capacity in which he is signing the document does not render the 
title unmarketable, jd At 866, citing Ford v. Warner, 176 S.W. 
885,888 Texas Civ. App. 1915). 
Since assignments are normally construed in accordance with 
basic contract law and under the analysis of the Pride Exploration ruling, the 
assignment in this matter is clearly valid. There was an oral assignment on or 
before August 13,1992 which was later reduced to writing on or about August 
31, 1992. Whether Mr. Townsend Sr. entered into both the verbal and written 
assignments either in his individual capacity or that as Trustee of the Townsend 
Trust, does not invalidate the assignment under the Pride Exploration decision. 
Since Mr. Townsend Sr. is the Trustee of the Townsend Trust, the oral and 
written assignments are not invalid if Mr. Townsend Sr. fails to specifically state 
the capacity in which he is assigning his interest to the Plaintiff. Since there was 
a valid assignment, the Townsend Trust is not the real party in interest. 
"Generally assignee is real party in interest and entitled to maintain 
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action." Lynch v. MacDonald. 367 P.2d 464 (Utah 1962). The Plaintiff, Steven C. 
Davis, is the real party in interest and as such the trial court improperly held the 
Townsend Trust was the real party in interest. 
VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Before Granting Motion to Dismiss, the Trial Court Must View 
Every Inference in the Light Most Favorable to the Party 
Opposing the Motion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
On appeal from dismissal of plaintiff's action at close of plaintiffs 
evidence, plaintiff is entitled to have review by appellate court of all 
the evidence, together with every logical inference most favorable 
to plaintiff, which might fairly be drawn therefrom. Martin v. 
Stevens. 243 P.2d 747 (Utah 1952). 
As previously outlined, there are sworn affidavits from both the 
Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, and Plaintiffs former attorney Richard C. Coxson. 
These affidavits indicate that there was a telephone conversation prior to August 
13, 1993 between Steven C. Davis, LeRoy Townsend Sr. and Richard Coxson 
wherein a verbal assignment was entered into prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
The record further demonstrates, that Mr. Coxson on August 13, 1993 filed a 
Complaint in this matter and specifically alleged at paragraph 13 that the Plaintiff 
is the assignee of LeRoy Townsend Sr. Since Mr. Coxson was a party to a 
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telephone conversation between Steven C. Davis and LeRoy Townsend Sr., it is 
obvious that there was a verbal assignment or Mr. Coxson as attorney for 
Steven C. Davis would not have alleged such in the Complaint. 
Consequently, if the Court views the facts in this case in favor of 
the Plaintiff, then the trial court should have held that there was an oral 
assignment between the Plaintiff and Mr. Townsend Sr. and, as such, the 
granting of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was clearly in error. 
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Not Allowing 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance or in the Alternative 
Allowing the Plaintiff to Amend His Complaint. 
Rule 17 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has 
been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of 
the action by, or joinder or substitution shall have the same effect 
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party 
in interest. 
This Court in Intermountain Physical Med. Assc. v. Micro Dex. 
Corp, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1997), held the following: 
Trial court should make every effort to insure that proceeding 
adjudicates rights of those necessary and intended to be before 
the court, in accordance with civil rules requiring every action to be 
prosecuted in the name of real party in interest, requiring 
allowance reasonable time after objection on ground action is not 
prosecuted in name of real party in interest for ratification, joinder, 
or substitution, and instructing court to join as party person whose 
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absence will prevent complete relief among those already parties, 
[emphasis added]. 
This Court in Intermountain Physical Med. Assc, held that the trial 
court abused its discretion in prohibiting the Plaintiff from amending its complaint 
or denying a continuance. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court 
should not have dismissed the action since the dismissal- prohibited the matter 
from being resolved on the merits of the case. id. 
Clearly, it was highly prejudicial for the trial court to grant the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss since the statute of limitations has lapsed, 
thereby prohibiting either the Plaintiff, Mr. LeRoy Townsend Sr., or the 
Townsend Trust from pursuing legal remedies otherwise available to them 
against the Defendants in this action. Instead the Court should have allowed the 
Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint or in the alternative granted the Plaintiff 
the continuance that was requested at the hearing in this matter. 
C. Even Though Trial Court Dismissed This Action Without 
Prejudice, The Dismissal Had the Effect of a Dismissal 
With Prejudice Since the Plaintiff is Now Barred by the 
Statute of Limitations 
The Order entered by the trial court in this matter specifically 
provides as follows: "The Court finds good and sufficient cause to dismiss this 
cause of action without prejudice." [R. at 453]. Even though the Order provides 
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for dismissal without prejudice, the resulting effect is a dismissal with prejudice 
since the statute of limitations prevents further adjudication of the cause of 
action in this matter. 
"While courts are given great latitude and discretion in application 
of law, they must still have sufficient grounds to apply harsh and permanent 
remedy of dismissal with prejudice." Intermountain, 739 P.2d at 1131. The trial 
court clearly did not have "sufficient grounds" to dismiss this action which 
ultimately prohibited the Plaintiff, Mr. Townsend Sr., or the Townsend Trust 
(themselves or through their assignee), from pursuing their cause of action on 
the merits. It was clearly an abuse of discretion. 
IX. 
SINCE THERE WAS A VALID ASSIGNMENT 
AND THE PLAINTIFF IS THE PROPER PARTY 
IN INTEREST, THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Construing the Facts Favorable to Defendants Indicates 
Judgment Must Be Granted to Plaintiff. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary 
judgment should be rendered forthwith if the pleadings show there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. "A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
record, reasonable minds could differ." Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613, 615 
(Utah 1982). It is appropriate for summary judgment to be granted when 
reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Center. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied. 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992). 
The facts show, in central and critical point, that Mr. Townsend Sr. 
paid $250,000.00 to Lee Ritter, that he received a stock certificate in a company 
that had not done business for several years when it was purchased, that owner 
of the defunct company received, at most, $5,000.00 for the sale of the company 
and its licensed multi-level software program, that the purchased company was 
not revived, that another company that intended to purchase the defunct 
company itself was dissolved involuntarily in 1993, that the recipient of the 
$250,000.00 check continues to do business in Texas with aloe vera products 
and an aloe vera farm and that Mr. Townsend Sr. has not received any benefits 
from his investment. 
B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Judgment Because Defendants 
Were Unjustly Enriched by His Assignor's $250,000.00. 
Lee Ritter received $250,000.00 from a man aged 84 who had 
been diagnosed with prostrate cancer. Others in his family had suffered or died 
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from cancer, and Mr. Townsend was told cancer patients could benefit from the 
use of the aloe vera. He paid over $250,000.00 to Lee Ritter for the "aloe 
business." 
Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter purchased an inactive company for 
approximately $5,000.00 to obtain its licensed multi-level software program, 
issued a stock certificate for 4000 shares in the inactive company to the 
contributor's family trust, never made the company active, agreed to a 
merger/purchase for the inactive company with a company that was involuntarily 
dissolved a few months later and not revived. 
Meanwhile, Lee Ritter has been engaged in the aloe vera 
business, but his elderly investor has nothing to show for his $250,000.00. 
Lee Ritter and his aloe vera associates, including Susan Ritter, 
have been unjustly enriched by money from Plaintiff's assignor. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the facts and arguments set forth above, it is clear that the 
trial court improperly granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss when the law 
specifically provides for oral assignments, and the facts in this matter clearly 
demonstrates that a valid oral assignment existed prior to the filing of this cause 
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of action. Additionally, equity requires that the verbal assignment in this case be 
upheld since the record plainly shows that the parties intended that there be an 
assignment. 
Similar to the result in Intermountain Physical Med. Assc the 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court, at a minimum, reverse the trial 
court's Order of Dismissal and specifically allow the Plaintiff to amend his 
Complaint or in the alternative grant Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. 
Since there was valid assignment and the Plaintiff is the proper 
party in interest, the trial court should have granted the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment since when there are no genuine issues of material fact. If 
the facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Defendant, it is clear that this court should reverse the trial court's order and 
grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted thia^/idiy of/August, 1! 
MARt ANN HANI 
Co-Counsel tor Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of August, 1999, I caused a copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to Byron Smith, 
counsel for Defendant/Appellee herein at the following address 
Byron Smith 
P.O. Box 1312 
Orem, UT 84059 
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BYRON L. SMITH (5229) 
SMITH & STRATTON 
1313 East 800 North 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Telephone (801) 221-1040 
Facsimile: (801) 221-7957 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, MUNICIPAL DIVISION, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
LEE RITTER, SUSAN RITTER 
and DARWIN C. FISHER, 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Case No 930400441 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
The above matter come before the Court on December 7, 1998 on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement. Plaintiff was not present but was 
represented by Mary Ann Hansen. Defendants were not present but were represented by Byron 
L. Smith. The Court having reviewed the evidence presented and having heard arguments and 
being fully advised in this matter, hereby Orders as follows: 
1. That neither Steven C. Davis nor LeRoy W. Townsend is the proper Plaintiff party in 
interest in this cause of action. 
2. That at the time this cause of action was filed by Steven C. Davis, that a valid assignment 
of the cause of action did not exist. 
3. The Court finds good and sufficient cause to dismiss this cause of action without 
prejudice. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITHf Clerk-" 
fr/Mfif) X Deputy 
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Dated this { H day of December, 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of The Defendants' Proposed Order were served upon the 
following persons by placing copies thereof in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on the 10* day of 
December, 1998. 
M. Karlynn Hinman 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2734 
Mary Ann Hansen 
852 North 910 East 
P.O. Box 1994 
Orem, Utah 84059-1994 
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